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RESUMEN 
 
El efecto “flypaper” es un enigma ampliamente documentado que se refiere al hecho 
de que los gobiernos sub-nacionales poseen una propensión al gasto de transferencias 
no condicionales que es mayor que la propensión al gasto de los ingresos privados. 
Basándonos en enfoques de la literatura previa que racionalizan este enigma a partir de 
la existencia de costos asociados con la recaudacion impositiva, desarrollamos un 
modelo simple de política fiscal óptima con impuestos distorsionantes que genera dos 
implicancias novedosas y testeables: (i) debería existir una asociación positiva entre el 
grado del efecto “flypaper” y el nivel de la tasa impositiva; y (ii) el efecto “flypaper” 
debería ser mayor cuanto menor sea la elasticidad de sustitución entre el gasto público 
y privado y, de hecho, debería desaparecer para altos grados de sustitución.   
Mostramos que estas hipótesis se cumplen tanto para las provincias argentinas como 
para los estados brasileños. 
Clasificación JEL: H62, H77, H21, H22, H41, H42. 
Palabras clave: efecto “flypaper”, impuestos distorsionantes, tasas impositivas, 
sustituibilidad entre gasto privado y público, congestión de bienes públicos. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The flypaper effect is a widely-documented puzzle whereby the propensity of 
subnational governmental units to spend out of unconditional transfers is higher than 
the propensity to spend out of private income. Building on previous insights in the 
literature that rationalize this puzzle using costly taxation, we develop a simple optimal 
fiscal policymodel with distortionary taxation that generates two novel and testable 
implications: (i) there should be a positive association between the degree of the 
flypaper effect and the level of the tax rate, and (ii) the flypaper effect should be larger 
the lower the elasticity of substitution between private and public spending and, in 
fact, should vanish for very high degrees of substitution. We show that these 
hypotheses hold for argentinean provinces and brazilian states. 
JEL Classification: H62, H77, H21, H22, H41, H42. 
Keywords: flypaper effect, distortionary taxation, tax rates, substitutability between 
private and public spending, congestion of public goods. 
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UNSTICKING THE FLYPAPER EFFECT USING 
DISTORTIONARY TAXATION* 
 
CARLOS A. VEGH± AND GUILLERMO VULETIN¥ 
 
“The flypaper effect results when a dollar of exogenous grant-in-aid leads to 
significantly greater public spending than an equivalent dollar of citizen 
income: Money sticks where it hits. Viewing governments as agents for a 
representative citizen voter, this empirical result is an anomaly.” 
 
Robert Inman (2008) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The flypaper effect is a well-known empirical regularity that refers to the 
greater responsiveness of subnational (i.e., state, provincial, city, or municipal) 
government spending to increases in unconditional intergovernmental grants 
than to increases in local income. According to Inman (2008), over 3,500 
research papers document this stylized fact for many countries and levels of 
government in the world. Specifically, these papers find that an extra dollar in 
personal income increases public spending by $0.02 to $0.05, while an 
equivalent increase in intergovernmental transfers triggers a rise in spending 
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that lies between $0.25 and $1.1.1 The term “flypaper effect” was originally 
coined in early papers (Henderson, 1968; Gramlich, 1969) that uncovered this 
empirical regularity. This catchy expression captures the idea that money 
sticks where it hits: money in the private sector –from private income –tends to 
remain in the private sector rather than being taxed away, while money in the 
public sector –from intergovernmental transfers –tends to be spent by the 
public sector rather thanbeing rebated to citizens. 
As Inman‟s quote illustrates, the flypaper effect has been regarded as a 
puzzle or an anomaly. This is indeed the case if one thinks in terms of a model 
in which a representative citizen‟s utility is maximized subject to his/her “full 
income”–composed by the sum of personal income and his/her share of 
unconditional fiscal transfers. Such a model would predict an identical 
propensity to spend out of citizen‟s income or unconditional intergovernmental 
transfers. After all, money is fungible and the source of financing should not 
affect the optimal allocation of resources. 
Explanations for the flypaper effect have abounded and can be divided into 
five different groups, two of them pointing to potential specification errors and 
the remaining three based on theoretical arguments. A first group of 
explanations argues that non-fungible conditional transfers, like the ones 
American states receive from matching grants, are misclassified as 
unconditional ones. A second group holds that omitted variables could also 
falsely support the flypaper effect if unobserved community‟s characteristics, 
which affect the technology or effective cost of public spending, were 
systematically related with citizens‟ income (Hamilton, 1983). The flypaper 
puzzle, however, remains after using truly unconditional grants (Inman, 1971; 
Gramlich and Galper, 1973; Bowman, 1974) or controlling for population 
characteristics. A third group holds that the standard model of a citizen‟s fiscal 
choice might be misspecified because either the citizen confuses the income 
effect generated by unconditional transfers with a price effect that reduces the 
average effective cost of public spending (Courant et al, 1979; Oates, 1979), 
he/she is not fully informed and fails to see the public budget (Filimon et al, 
1982) or, even when fully informed, he/she might not behave completely 
rationally (Hinesand Thaler, 1995). A fourth group uses political science 
                                                          
1 Dollery and Worthington (1996), Bailey and Connolly (1998), and Gamkhar and Shah (2007) 
provide detailed surveys of the empirical evidence on the flypaper effect. 
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arguments that exploit the role that inefficient political institutions have in 
revealing citizens‟ preferences (Chernick, 1979; Knight, 2002; Roemer and 
Silvester, 2002). Our paper relates to a fifth (much less discussed) group which 
relies on distortionary taxation (Hamilton, 1986; Aragón, 2009; Dalhby, 
2011).2 Hamilton (1986) was the first to point out theoretically that the 
flypaper effect can arise because subnational governments typically use 
distortionary taxes to finance at least part of their expenditures. An increase in 
private income will lead to a greater demand for both public and private 
spending. Public spending, however, requires larger tax revenues which can 
only be raised by increasing the tax rate (i.e., distorting private sector‟s 
choices). In contrast, an increase in transfers provides the government with a 
source of income that is (from the point of view of the subnational unit) 
distortion-free. Hence, an increase in transfers will naturally lead to higher 
public spending than will the same increase in private income. Since 
Hamilton‟s (1986) contribution, however, there has been little work on the 
possible role of distortionary taxation in explaining the flypaper effect. Dalhby 
(2011) suggests that this might be in part due to the early scepticism expressed 
by Hines and Thaler (1995) and Mieszkowski (1994) and, implicitly, by Oates 
(1999). For example, Hines and Thaler (1995, page 221) argued that “the 
marginal deadweight losses from taxes are typically far too small to reconcile 
the large differences between propensities to spend.” In turn, Oates (1999) “in 
his comprehensive review of the literature on fiscal federalism, does not refer 
to Hamilton‟s paper in discussing the flypaper effect” (Dalhby, 2011, page 4). 
More recently, Becker and Mulligan (2003) and Volden (2007) have 
developed political economy models that exhibit a flypaper effect because 
recipient governments rely on distortionary taxes to finance part of their 
spending. However, neither of these papers shows that distortionary taxes can 
explain the magnitude of the flypaper effect. More closely related to our work, 
Dalhby (2011) presents a model in which the emphasis is on the marginal cost 
of public funds and finds that, given reasonable parameters values, the model 
can explain considerable part of the flypaper effect. Unfortunately –and in 
sharp contrast to other explanations developed in the flypaper literature –there 
is little empirical evidence on the validity of the distortionary taxation channel. 
 
                                                          
2 Aragón (2009) builds upon Hamilton.s framework using real collection costs arguments. 
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The main focus of our paper is precisely to present empirical evidence on 
the relevance of the distortionary taxation channel. We develop a simple 
optimal fiscal policy model that generates two novel and testable implications. 
First, there is a positive correlation between the flypaper effect and the level of 
the tax rate. In other words, when tax rates are high the flypaper effect is large 
and viceversa. This occurs because tax rates are positively associated with the 
degree of tax distortion. When tax rates are low, the willingness to spend out 
of transfers and local income is relatively similar because the tax distortion is 
low. As tax rates increase so does the tax distortion, which increases the 
incentives to spend out of transfers relative to local income. In other words, the 
size of the flypaper effect follows directly from the level of the tax distortion, 
which is positively associated with the level of the tax rate. 
Second, the lower (higher) the elasticity of substitution between private and 
government spending, the higher (lower) the flypaper effect. If the elasticity of 
substitution is low, policymakers are much more willing to bear the tax 
distortion by imposing high tax rates, precisely because government spending 
is not easily substitutable for private spending. Therefore, an extra dollar of 
transfers will trigger an increase in government spending larger than an 
equivalent increase in income because the desire to allocate part of such extra 
dollar to government spending is strong and because the tax distortion already 
borne is high. As the substitutability between public and private spending 
increases, the willingness to bear tax distortions decreases because most 
resources could be more easily allocated to private spending without any tax 
distortion cost. As a result, tax rates will decrease. Hence, as the 
substitutability between private and public spending increases, the size of the 
flypaper effect will shrink because the willingness to allocate part of such an 
extra dollar in government spending weakens and, more importantly, because 
the willingness to bear tax distortions also diminishes. Inthe extreme case of 
perfect substitutability between private and public spending, the flypaper effect 
vanishes. 
We test the two predictions of the model by using two different datasets for 
Argentinean provinces and Brazilian states. Unlike the American system of 
intergovernmental transfers that are typically conditional on states‟spending in 
particular areas (mainly health and social programs), Argentinean provinces 
and Brazilian states rely mostly on a tax-sharing system regulated by laws that 
rarely change and whereby transfers are directly linked to federal taxrevenues. 
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As will become clearer later, Argentinean provinces and Brazil states receive 
fiscal transfers that are, in essence, unconditional and exogenous to 
government spending. 
Using a novel dataset on gross receipts from taxes that we put together 
from primary sources in Argentinean provinces, we find that the flypaper 
effect is high when tax rates are relatively high and significantly weakens as 
tax rates fall. We show this by splitting the sample into provinces with tax 
rates above and below the median. While present in both samples, the flypaper 
effect is about 40 percent larger in the sample with higher tax rates. 
We then test whether the flypaper effect decreases with the degree of 
substitutability between private and government spending by using different 
government spending categories.To this effect, we first follow a standard 
methodology in public finance that allows us to estimate the degree of 
“publicness” of different spending categories. Specifically, we classify 
different public spending categories for Argentinean provinces and Brazilian 
states into (i) pure public goods, (ii) impure public goods, (iii) private goods, 
and (iv) undetermined. ForArgentina, for instance, we find that police and 
housing/urban renewal are pure public goods, while education and public 
welfare are private goods. We then test the degree of the flypaper effect for 
these different categories and find that, by and large, the flypaper effect is 
much larger for pure public goods than for private goods, as predicted by our 
model. 
The paper proceeds as follows. To set the stage for the discussion, Section 
2 develops a simple Ramsey model to illustrate the flypaper effect as an 
anomaly. In a world with lump sum taxes, the propensity of the Ramsey 
planner to spend out of private income or outside transfers is the same. We 
then introduce distortionary taxation to illustrate the argument put forward by 
Hamilton (1986) and show how the mere presence of distortionary taxation is 
enough to generate the flypaper effect. Section 3 develops a more general 
version of the distortionary taxation model in which we identify two key 
testable empirical implications: (i) there should be a positive correlation 
between the flypaper effect and the level of the tax rate, and (ii) the flypaper 
effect should be larger (smaller) the lower (higher) the elasticity of substitution 
between public and private spending. Section 4 briefly describes fiscal 
federalism in Argentina and Brazil and emphasizes the unconditional and 
exogenous nature of their fiscal transfers. We then turn to the regression 
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analysis. Section 5 establishes the strong presence of the flypaper effect. We 
then test our two key empirical implications in Sections 6 and 7 and find 
compelling support for them. Final thoughts are presented in Section 8. 
 
II. Benchmark model 
 
This section develops a simple Ramsey model of optimal fiscal policy 
model that allows us to rationalize the flypaper effect and understand the role 
of distortionary taxation. To keep the model as simple as possible, we will 
think of a static economy inhabited by a benevolent fiscal authority (FA) and a 
representative citizen or private agent (PA) blessed with perfect foresight.3 
There are two possible tax systems: (i) a non-distortionary lump-sum tax, and 
(ii) a distortionary consumption tax.4 There are three (perishable) goods: a 
publicly-provided good ( ), a consumption good subject to taxation (  ), and a 
consumption good not subject to taxation (   ).5 These three goods are perfect 
substitutes in production and therefore the two relative prices are one. 
Production is exogenous (i.e., there is an endowment). 
Under a non-distortionary taxation system, the private agent‟s budget 
constraint is given by 
 
                                                          
3 Since this is a static model, it can be thought of as a closed economy. 
4 Of course, solving the Ramsey‟s planner problem with lump sum taxation is equivalent to 
solving the social planner‟s problem (we set it up as a Ramsey problem to keep the symmetry 
with the distortionary taxation case). The social planner‟s problem is the typical approach used 
in this literature (Henderson, 1968; Gramlich, 1969; Knight, 2002; Inman, 2008). Specifically, 
these papers maximize the representative citizen‟s utility subject to his/her “full 
income””constraint specified as the sum of personal income and his/her share of government‟s 
unconstrained fiscal transfers. In other words, resources are assumed to be fungible. 
5 There are different ways of introducing a tax distortion into the model. The most obvious 
alternative would be to add leisure to the model, in which case a consumption tax would distort 
the consumption/leisure choice. We prefer this alternative specification (with one good being 
taxed and the other not) because it enables us to isolate the distortionary effects stemming from 
(exogenous) income shocks. While not modeled, the good that is non-taxed could be thought of 
as the underground economy. In a monetary model, our distinction between taxable and non-
taxable goods would correspond to the standard cash versus credit goods specification, wherein 
inflation taxes only cash goods. 
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                                  (1) 
 
where   is the exogenous level of output and   is the lump sum tax. Under a 
distortionary consumption tax, the private agent‟s budget constraint is given by 
 
                                  (2) 
 
where   is the consumption tax rate on   . 
Without loss of generality, and in order to obtain analytical solutions, we 
use log preferences6: 
 
                                                    (3) 
 
Under a non-distortionary taxation system, the fiscal authority‟s budget 
constraint is given by 
 
                                 (4) 
 
where   denotes unconditional exogenous fiscal transfers. Under a 
distortionary consumption tax system, the fiscal authority‟s budget constraint 
is given by 
 
                                  (5) 
 
Combining (1) and (4) or (2) and (5) we obtain the economy‟s constraint: 
 
                                                          
6 We assume equal weights on each good for simplicity. Similar results would hold if we 
allowed differentweights. 
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                                    (6) 
 
II. 1. Results 
 
In this section, we solve the Ramsey planner‟s problem under (i) non-
distortionary and (ii) distortionary taxation. This strategy allows us to 
understand the flypaper as an “anomaly” (case 1) and the role of distortionary 
taxation (case 2). 
For further reference, let us define three measures. The first measure (FP) 
captures the flypaper effect itself: 
 
   
  
  
 
  
  
                            (7) 
 
A positive value of this measure, which means that     ⁄      ⁄ , 
would rationalize the flypaper effect typically observed in the data. 
Conversely, a negative or zero value of this measure would contradict the 
empirical regularity. 
To measure any potential distortion, we define tax distortion (TD) as 
 
   
        
   
                                  (8) 
 
where      is the level of     associated with non-distortionary taxation. 
 
II. 1. 1. The flypaper effect viewed as an “anomaly” 
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Under a non-distortionary (i.e., lump sum) tax system the flypaper effect 
commonly observed in reality is an “anomaly;” that is to say, it cannot be 
rationalized.7 Solving the Ramsey planner‟s problem, we obtain 
 
                                     (9) 
 
because 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
                             (10) 
 
These results correspond to the ones obtained in traditional papers in the 
literature (e.g.,Henderson (1968) and Gramlich (1969)). Without distortionary 
taxation, the model is clearly not able to explain why the source of financing 
should matter for expenditure decisions. Naturally, this case achieves the first 
best in which there is no distortion (i.e.,     ). Moreover, the source of the 
shock (  or  ) does not affect the changes in private consumption allocations: 
 
    
  
 
   
  
 
   
  
 
    
  
 
 
 
                                  (11) 
 
 
II. 1. 2. The flypaper rationalized through distortionary taxation 
 
We now show that the flypaper effect can be rationalized just by using 
distortionary taxation.8 Solving the Ramsey planner‟s problem, we obtain 
 
    
 
 
                                                     (12) 
                                                          
7 Appendix 9.2.1 shows all derivations. 
8 Appendix 9.2.2 shows all derivations. 
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because 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
                     (13) 
 
We also obtain 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
  
                           (14) 
 
Unlike the non-distortionary case (Section 2.1.1) the source of financing 
does matter. An increase in fiscal transfers increases government spending 
(total private consumption) by a larger (lower) magnitude than in the non-
distortionary case, while an increase in income increases government spending 
(total private consumption) by a smaller (larger) magnitude than in the non-
distortionary case (see equations (10), (11), (13) and (14)).9 That is to say, 
money sticks where it hits. 
An increase in income ( ) increases the demand for both public and private 
consumption. In order to finance the increase in government spending, the FA 
must increase tax collection. Under distortionary taxation, any attempt to 
increase revenues by increasing the tax ratewould induce the PA to partially 
shift away from    towards     . In fact 
 
   
    
    
                             (15) 
 
that is to say, the tax distortion is equivalent to the tax rate. This distortion 
partially offsets the desire to increase government spending. The change in the 
tax rate   and tax distortion TD given an income shock is given by 
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
  
       
                                        (16) 
                                                          
9 By total private consumption, we mean the sum of   and    . 
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As a result, most of the increase in income is allocated to private 
consumption (see equation (14)). 
An increase in fiscal transfers ( ) also increases the demand for both public 
and private consumption. However, in order to finance the increase in 
government spending, the FA does not need to increase tax collection. Quite to 
the contrary, the FA decreases the tax rate inorder to allow part of those new 
resources to be allocated to private consumption 
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
  
       
                                        (17) 
 
In other words, distortionary taxation generates the flypaper effect by 
making it more costly (in distortionary terms) to use funds that have accrued to 
the private sector than funds that have been given to the government via fiscal 
transfers. While the assumption of fungibility rules out the flypaper effect in a 
non-distortionary world, it is actually consistent with the flypaper effect in a 
distortionary world (and, is in fact, the second-best). 
As in Hamilton (1986), while this model rationalizes the flypaper effect, it 
does not provide clear testable implications. The next section modifies the 
model‟s preferences in order to obtain some testable implications that we can 
take to the data. 
 
III. General model 
 
This section generalizes the Ramsey planner‟s problem from Section II.1.2 
by assuming more general preferences. The rest of the model remains the 
same. As will become clear below, these more general preferences will allow 
us to isolate the critical role of the elasticity of substitution between public and 
private spending. Formally, let preferences be given by 
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                              (18) 
 
where   represents a composite consumption good. The parameter   
captures the elasticity of substitution between taxable (  ) and non-taxable 
(   ) goods, with a low   indicating little substitution. As   becomes larger, 
taxable and non-taxable goods become more substitutable. In the same vein, 
the parameter   captures the elasticity of substitution between public ( ) and 
private spending ( ). Low values of   are associated with a low degree of 
substitution between government and private spending. Moreover10, 
 
  
 (
   
  
) (
   
  
)
            
                                             (19) 
 
When     (i.e.,     and    tend to be consumed in fixed proportions) 
the ratio        is highly inelastic to tax rate changes; while if     (i.e., 
    and    tend to be perfect substitutes) then the ratio        is extremely 
elastic to tax rate changes. The log case corresponds to the case where the 
change in       is proportional to changes in the tax rate (   ). The 
parameter   will thus capture how distortionary is the consumption tax system. 
 
III. 1. Results  
 
Since the model cannot be solved analytically, we solve it numerically. To 
this end, we formulate the Ramsey planner‟s problem in very general terms. 
Specifically, the Ramsey planner chooses g,     and    to maximize the PA‟s 
                                                          
10 Appendix 9.2.3 shows this derivation. 
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utility, given by (18), subject to the implementability conditions derived from 
the PA‟s maximization problem, the PA‟s constraint (2) and the FA‟s 
constraint (5).11 
While our numerical exercise is not a calibration exercise, we choose the 
following parameterization that is consistent with the Argentinean case.12 We 
normalize output to one hundred; i.e.,        . Some studies (Amano and 
Wirjanto, 1997; Chiu, 2001; Okubo, 2003; Auteri and Constantini, 2010) 
estimate that the elasticity of substitution between private ( ) and government 
spending ( ) ranges between 0.6 and 1.4; for this reason, we select      in 
our benchmark parameterization.13 Unfortunately, there are no estimates for 
the degree of substitutability between taxable and non taxable goods ( ). Since 
   is the observed taxable private consumption, we could think of     as the 
informal (i.e., underground) economy. 
The informal economy comprises about 40 percent of actual Argentinean 
output (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Vuletin, 2009).14 We also know that 
provincial government spending and fiscal transfers represent about 16 and 7 
percent of official output, respectively. Therefore, government spending 
represents about 10 percent of actual output (i.e.,       ) and taxable 
consumption represents about 54 percent of total consumption (i.e.,    
     ). We set thevalue of   such that it matches 2 ratios:            (i.e., 
the informal economy represents 40 percent of income) and           
      (i.e., provincial government spending represents about 16 percent of 
official output). The elasticity of substitution between    and     consistent 
with these two ratios is about 3; i.e.,    . This value seems reasonable since 
the elasticity between private and public spending is much lower than the one 
between private taxable and non taxable consumption. We then use this 
parameterization and allow   to vary between 0 and 4. We do so because even 
                                                          
11 Appendix 9.2.4 shows the Ramsey planner problem. 
12 Similar results are obtained when calibrating the model for the Brazilian economy. Results are 
not shown for brevity. 
13 Using U.S. data, Amano and Wirjanto (1997) estimate an elasticity of substitution of 0.9, 
while Chiu (2002) and Okubo (2003) find values of 1.1 and 1.4 using Taiwanese and Japanese 
data, respectively. Based on 15 Eurpean countries, Auteri and Constantini (2010) find that this 
elasticity ranges between 0.59 and 0.76. 
14 Estimates for the informal economy range between 8 and 30 percent for OECD countries and 
13 and 76 percent for developing countries. 
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though the elasticity of substitution between private consumption and overall 
government spending seems to be close to unity, the elasticity across several 
categories of goods varies. We should expect   to be close to zero in the case 
of pure public goods and relatively high in the case of private goods that could 
potentially be publicly provided. 
Figure 1 (panel A) shows that an extra dollar of fiscal transfers increases 
government spending by a larger magnitude than an equivalent increase in 
citizen‟s income.15 This version of the model also rationalizes the flypaper 
effect (panel B). More importantly, we find that the flypaper effect is more 
important for low levels of   (i.e., when private and government spending is 
hardly substitutable) and becomes less relevant as   increases (i.e., private and 
government spending become more substitutable). This occurs because the tax 
distortion (  ) and tax rate ( ) observed for low levels of   are quite high and 
tend to decrease as   increases (panels C and D). In other words, for low levels 
of  , the fiscal authority needs to spend a relatively large amount because 
public spending is not easily substitutable for private one. To finance this 
spending, the FA sets a high tax rate and hence imposes a large tax distortion. 
As suggested by equation (15), tax rates are positively associated with the tax 
distortion. Under such circumstances, an increase in citizen‟s income by a 
dollar increasesgovernment spending by a smaller magnitude than an 
equivalent increase in fiscal transfers.While a fiscal transfer shock decreases 
the tax distortion, an income shock increases it (panel E). These last results 
also coincide with equations (16) and (17). As   increases, private and 
government spending become more substitutable. The fiscal authority thus 
becomes more willing to allow most spending to be allocated to private 
consumption, which reduces the tax distortion. As a result, the flypaper effect 
is positively related to the tax rate (panel F). 
In contrast to our benchmark model (Section 2), this alternative model 
yields two key implications that we can take to the data. First, if the source of 
variation is the degree of substitutability between government and private 
spending, the size of the flypaper effect and the tax rates will be positively 
related. Second, the flypaper effect is larger when the degree of substitutability 
between private and government spending is lower. 
                                                          
15 We would replicate the results obtained in section II.1.2 if we assumed    ,    , 
      and      . 
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IV. Fiscal federalism in Argentina and Brazil 
 
In order to test the two key implications of our theoretical model, we use 
data corresponding to Argentinean provinces and Brazilian states for the 
period 1963-2006 and 1985-2005, respectively. There are several detailed 
studies of the fiscal federalism arrangements in Argentina and Brazil.16 Hence, 
we just provide a brief account and instead focus on characterizing two key 
features that are useful for our purposes; namely, the unconditional and 
exogenous (to public spending) nature of federal transfers to provinces/states. 
Argentina and Brazil are both federal republics. Argentina is a federation of 
23 provinces and an autonomous city, Buenos Aires. Brazil comprises 26 
states and a federal district. The size of the government, measured by the ratio 
of government expenditure to GDP, averages 35 percent for Argentina and 45 
percent for Brazil. Both countries have highly decentralized government 
spending. On average, Argentinean provinces and Brazilian states are 
responsible for about 40 percent of overall fiscal spending. On the other hand, 
tax collection is highly centralized at the federal level. This implies a 
particularly high vertical imbalance measured as the ratio of intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers to subnational expenditure, which averages 40 percent (column 
1, Tables 1 and 2). 
The corner stone of Argentina‟s and Brazil‟s intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer system is atax-sharing arrangement whereby the federal government 
transfers to provinces/states some share of federal tax revenues. Indeed, this 
source of transfers represents (as a percentage of total federal transfers) about 
70 percent for Argentinean provinces and more than 60 percent for Brazilian 
states. 
While Argentina and Brazil differ in the specifics regarding the 
mechanisms of the intergovernmental fiscal transfers, both tax-sharing systems 
exhibit two key features that prove to be particularly useful for our study. First, 
they are mandated either by the constitution (Brazil) or by law (in Argentina), 
                                                          
16 See for example, Núñez Miñana (1998), Gomez Sabaini and Gaggero (1997), Tommasi et al 
(2001), Porto (2004), and Ter-Minassian (1997), Afonso and Mello (2000), and Sturzenegger 
and Werneck (2006) for Brazil. 
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as opposed to being discretionary. In essence, these laws regulate how shared 
tax collection (which includes most domestic taxes, such as VAT and income 
taxes) is distributed between the central government and provinces/states 
(which is referred to as primary distribution) and how provincial/state funds 
are distributed among provinces/states (which is referred to as secondary 
distribution). These transfers are unconditional in the sense that, by 
constitution/law, provinces/states are entitled to them based on their mere 
existence. This is in sharp contrast to the American federal fiscal system, 
which relies mainly on the federal government sharing with states the cost of 
some selected programs such as Medicaid, Food Stamp Program, State 
Children‟s Health Insurance Program expenditures, Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families Contingency Funds, the Federal share of Child Support 
Enforcement collections, and Child Care Mandatory and Matching Funds of 
the Child Care and Development Fund.17 By design, then, American federal 
transfers are conditional and endogenous to current state spending on those 
particular programs. 
Second, the Argentinean and Brazilian tax-sharing systems are 
characterized by institutional rigidity. The primary and secondary distributions 
rarely change. For example, the secondary distribution shares for Argentinean 
provincial governments have changed only fourtimes since 1963 and changes 
have been minor (Table 3).18 Indeed, the variability of within-province 
secondary distribution shares represents less than one percent of overall 
variability. Given the intrinsic unconditional and rigid nature of the 
Argentinean and Braziliantax-sharing systems, fiscal transfers are, in essence, 
unconditional and exogenous (to public spending), a critical property assumed 
in our theoretical models of Sections 2 and 3. 
In addition to collecting subnational output, total spending, and tax-sharing 
based fiscal transfers data, we also gathered government spending by main 
categories including police, fire, water, sewer and sanitation systems, housing 
and urban renewal, parks and recreation, health and hospitals, education, 
science and technology, public welfare, and spending on economic services 
                                                          
17 Medicaid alone represented around 45 percent of total federal transfers to states and local 
governments in 2008. 
18 Province‟s/state‟s historical secondary distribution shares reflect both contributions to the 
federal coffers s well as redistributive considerations. 
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(Tables 1 and 2).19 Moreover, we also constructed a novel dataset from 
primary sources that includes general gross receipt tax rates for the period 
1963-2006 for 13provinces.20 A gross receipts tax, sometimes referred to as a 
gross excise tax, is a tax on the total gross revenues of a company, regardless 
of their source. It is similar to a sales tax, but it is levied on the seller of goods 
or services rather than on the consumer. General gross receipt tax revenues 
represent about half of provinces‟own tax collection and are followed in 
importance by the legal documentation tax with less than 20 percent in terms 
of total taxcollection. Moreover, unlike other provincial/state taxes that have 
several tax rates and fees, the general gross receipt tax rate has a single rate 
that makes it easier to assess the stance on taxation policy. This tax rate dataset 
is quite balanced covering more than 90 percent ofpotential observations. 
 
V. Flypaper effect. Benchmark results 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show the basic flypaper regressions for Argentinean 
provinces and Brazilian states, respectively. We consider the following 
specification: 
 
                   ∑     
 
 
     
 
where  ,   and   represent government spending, output, and fiscal 
transfers, respectively, all expressed in real and per capita terms. The variables 
   are   additional socio-economic/geographical control variables typically 
included in this literature. Column 1 in Tables 4 and 5 reports basic OLS 
regressions without controls and assuming that the residuals are homoscedastic 
and have no autocorrelation. In both countries, the marginal propensity to 
spend out of fiscal transfers is clearly larger than for local output; that is, there 
                                                          
19 Economic services refer to activities that support, develop, control and enhance economic 
activities in the agricultural, industry, energy, and mining sectors.  
20 The 13 provinces are Catamarca, Chaco, Chubut, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, Formosa, La Pampa, 
Misiones, Neuquén, Río Negro, Salta, Santa Fe, and Tierra del Fuego. 
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is a flypaper effect. The regressions reported in Column 2 relax the assumption 
of homoscedasticity and independence within groupsby calculating robust 
variances and allowing the presence of error autocorrelation within subnational 
units. It should come as no surprise that these modifications increase the 
standard errors, reducing the t-statistics. The statistical significance of the 
flypaper effect, however, remains strong. 
Like other papers in the literature, columns 3, 4 and 5 include, respectively, 
several geographic, demographic and political economy control variables 
including terrain roughness, share of water bodies, population density, and pre-
electoral periods.21 The results for Argentina consistently show that provinces 
with higher terrain roughness and share of waterbodies have higher 
government spending per capita. Arguably, these features increase the cost of 
providing public goods. Pre-electoral periods are associated with higher 
government spending in Argentina and Brazil. Since there might exist other 
unobservable factors that affect government spending, column 6 also controls 
for subnational units fixed effect. Even after controlling for all these factors, 
the flypaper effect remains as a strong empirical regularity in the two 
countries. With all these controls in place, the size of the flypaper effect is 
1.276 and 1.016 for Argentinean provinces and Brazilian states, respectively. 
That is to say, for the case of Argentina, an extra $1 in personal income 
increases public spending by $0.088, while an equivalent increase in 
intergovernmental transfers triggers a rise in spending of $1.364. For the case 
of Brazil, an extra $1 in personal income increases public spending by $0.002, 
while an equivalent increase in intergovernmental transfers triggers a rise in 
spendingof $1.018. Moreover, for both countries we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the flypaper effect is equal to 1.22 
 
VI. Flypaper effectand tax rates 
 
A key theoretical implication of the model developed in Section 3 is that 
the flypaper effect is positively related to tax rates. In Table 6, we estimate 
panel fixed effect regressions like the ones estimated in column 6 of Tables 4 
                                                          
21 See Appendix 9.1 for details regarding definition and sources of variables. 
22 The p-values are 0.1746 for Argentinean provinces and 0.9412 for Brazilian states. 
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and 5 but breaking down the Argentinean sample according to whether tax 
rates are above or below the median. The flypaper is present in both samples. 
However, while the marginal propensity to spend out of transfers is about 17 
times as large as the one out of income when tax rates are high (i.e., above the 
median), it isonly about 9 times as high when tax rates are low (i.e., below the 
median). Such difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.23 
 
VII. Flypaper effectand degree of substitutability between private and 
government spending 
 
Another key theoretical implication of the model developed in Section 3 is 
that the flypaper effect falls with the degree of substitutability between 
government and private spending. We test this implication by analyzing 
whether the flypaper effect is stronger (weaker) in government spending 
categories which are hardly (easily) substitutable for private spending. 
Government spending is hardly (easily) substitutable for private spending 
when such goods are public (private) goods (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; 
Reiter and Weichenrieder, 1999). 
A pure public good is conventionally characterized by being non-rivalrous 
(i.e., the marginal cost of an additional person consuming it is zero) and non-
excludable (i.e., the cost of excluding an individual from its benefits is 
prohibitively costly). Archetypal examples include national defense and 
lighthouses. Because of these properties, consumers should not be excluded 
from the good‟s consumption. Since private markets are expected to exclude 
consumers by charging a positive price to cover intramarginal costs, some kind 
of government intervention –often via public provision –is needed to avoid 
market failure and provide these goods at the socially optimal level. 
While conceptually attractive, pure public goods are rare since most goods 
realistically present congestion effects. Since seminal work by Borcherding 
and Deacon (1972) and Bergstromand Goodman (1973), many studies have 
estimated the degree of “publicness” of public goods by measuring the 
                                                          
23 We can reject the null hypothesis that the size of the relative ‡ypaper e¤ect from the high tax 
rate sample (17 times) is the same as the one of the low tax rate sample (9 times) (p-value 
0.0013). 
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strength of congestion or crowding out characteristics of these goods. These 
studies assume that the usefulness of a public good to a given individual,   , is 
determined by the function        , where   is the population size,   is 
the quantity of the public good and   is the congestion parameter. If   were a 
pure public good, then    . Progressively larger values of   reflect larger 
congestion or crowding out effects, with     indicating “congestion” 
equivalent to a private good. Based on Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), most 
studies estimate the following equation: 
 
      
                                       ∑      
 
      (20) 
 
where   ,  , and   represent the level of government spending in 
category  , output, and population, respectively. The variable           aims 
at capturing the perceived price of the public spending. Strategies to measure 
this variable vary depending on available information. For example, Bergstrom 
and Goodman (1973) measure the share of tax on real propertywhich is paid by 
a citizen with the median income for his/her community, while McMillanet al 
(1981) proxy the tax share of the average household by dividing residential 
and farm taxes per household by total municipal tax revenue. The variables    
represent   additionalsocio-economic control variables. Following Bergstrom 
and Goodman (1973), the congestion or crowding out parameter   is then 
determined as24 
 
  
  
    
                         (21) 
                                                          
24 We follow Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) for the derivation of the congestion or crowding 
out parameter  . Defining    as the quantity of private goods, an individual maximizes his/her 
utility function           subject to the intertemporal constraint                   which 
is equivalent to                     . Therefore, the determination of his/her demand 
function for    is formally equivalent to finding an ordinary demand function where the price is 
           
 . Assuming that there are constant income and price elasticities    and    for the 
good   , then the demand function for    is   [           ]    
  . The quantity of   
demanded is    times the quantity of    demanded. Hence, his/her demand for   is 
    [          
 ]    
              
            
  . Hence,            and thus 
the congestion or crowding out parameter   can be estimated as            . 
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where    and    are the estimated elasticities of expenditures in category   
with respect to population and tax share, respectively. If the null hypothesis 
that     cannot be rejected, the category of spending can be rationalized as a 
pure public good with no congestion or crowding out effects. In other words, if 
a government spending category    were a pure public good, then larger 
populations would not increase such spending (i.e.,     ). In contrast, if the 
null hypothesis that     cannot be rejected, the good is private because the 
citizen receives at most “his/her aliquot share.” If      , we are in the 
presence of a public good with important congestion or crowding out effects. 
Following Reiter and Weichenrieder (1999) such good can be defined as 
impure public. 
Most studies use cross-sectional data to estimate   and the figures vary 
depending on several factors including, among others, the spending category, 
the level of government used (city, municipality, county, state) and the sample 
period.25 Typically, these studies lay out two key findings. First, not all 
publicly provided goods are pure public goods, since the degree of congestion 
varies widely. In fact, some studies find moderate levels of congestion, which 
suggests impure public goods. On other occasions, however, severe congestion 
effects exist, which implies a strong degree of “privateness”. This striking 
finding –that many of the goods and services publicly provided do not have the 
usual “publicness” properties of collective goods –generated strong reactions. 
For example, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) in their original study ask: 
“Why, if there are not increasing returns in the municipal provision of the 
goods and services we study, is their provision in the public domain?”. A 
second frequent finding is that, in many categories, the standard errors of   are 
large enough to imply that neither     nor     can be rejected. Some 
papers rationalize this as evidence that those goods show an important degree 
of congestion since it cannot be rejected that    . However, the fact that 
    cannot be rejected either actually reveals that not much can be said 
about these goods. For this reason, we will classify them as undetermined. 
                                                          
25 Most papers analyze American subnational units; only McMillan et al (1981) study Ontario‟s 
municipalities for 1976. To the best of our knowledge, no equivalent studies exist for 
Argentinean provinces or Brazilian states. 
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Our strategy consists of two steps. First, following the standard 
methodology captured in equation (20) above, we empirically determine the 
degree of “publicness” of several important spending categories including fire, 
police, education, housing and urban renewal, health and hospitals, parks and 
recreation, public welfare, economic services, science and technology, and 
water, sewer and sanitation systems.26 The categories used represent about 60 
percent and 50 percent of total spending in Argentinean provinces and 
Brazilian states, respectively. After classifying these spending categories into 
(i) pure public, (ii) impure public, (iii) private or (iv) undetermined, we test 
whether there is a positive relationship between the degree of “publicness”–
which we take as a proxy for the degree of substitutability between private and 
public goods –and the size of the flypaper effect. In other words, we test 
whether the size of the flypaper is larger for pure public good categories than 
for impure public or private goods. 
 
VII. 1. “Publicness” of public spending 
 
In order to classify a spending category, we estimate regression (20) and 
use equation (21) to test whether the good or service provided is pure public 
(    and    ), impure public (    and    ), private (    and 
   ), or undetermined (    and    ). We estimate these regressions 
using panel fixed effects and allowing errors to have heterocedasticity as well 
as autocorrelation. Allowing for a fixed effect per subnational unit is very 
important in this particular context in order to control for the very well known 
“zoo effect” introduced by Oates (1988). Oates argues that high levels of 
congestion, like the ones frequently found in the literature, may not reflect 
congestion or crowding out effects but rather the fact that some type of goods 
and services are provided only when population reaches certain high levels 
(e.g., expenditure on a zoo). By including fixed effects per subnational unit, we 
reduce such biasas the population elasticity coefficient is estimated exploiting 
only the population variation within each subnational unit. Including fixed 
effects also partially controls for preferences for public spending, as long as 
they remain constant over time. In this sense, fixed effects act as an imperfect 
                                                          
26 We do not include spending categories when data are considerably incomplete or when 
services offered are not final products (such as general and financial administration). 
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substitute for socio-economic control variables typically included in regression 
(20). As discussed in great detail in Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) 
measuring the tax share variable presents some conceptual and practical 
difficulties. We measure the           of the average individual by dividing 
the most important tax collection category revenue per individual by total 
subnational unit tax revenue. The most important tax collection category is 
gross receipt tax for Argentinean provinces and state value-added tax for 
Brazilian states. 
Tables 7 and 8 show our findings for Argentinean provinces and Brazilian 
states, respectively, including population density as a control variable. Table 7 
shows that total public spending in Argentinean provinces is an impure public 
good with a congestion parameter of 0.499. Police as well as housing and 
urban renewal are pure public goods, while public welfare and education are 
private goods. The degree of “publicness” of water and sewer systems, science 
and technology, and economic services cannot be determined. Table 8 does not 
show precise results regarding the degree of congestion of total expenditure for 
Brazilian states. Economic services are found to be a pure public good, while 
police, public welfare, and education are private goods. Housing and urban 
renewal as well as spending in health and hospitals show large standard errors, 
which does not allow us to classify them as either public or private goods. It is 
not surprising that both public welfare as well as education are found to be 
private goods. As discussed by Stiglitz (1974) in the context of education, 
“there seems to be little question that the marginal cost of educating an 
additional individual is substantial (probably close to the average cost, at least 
for large school systems).” 
 
VII. 2. Size of flypaper effect as a function of the substitutability between 
public and private spending 
 
As discussed in Section 7, high (low) levels of “publicness” are expected to 
be associated with low (high) levels of substitutability between public and 
private spending. In other words, in the case of pure public goods, private 
spending can be hardly rationalized as a substitute for government spending. 
On the other hand, in the case of private goods, private spending could act as a 
substitute for government spending. Considering the theoretical model 
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described in Section 3, we should expect to find that the size of the flypaper 
effect is bigger for spending categories that involve pure public goods than for 
those associated with private goods. 
Tables 9 and 10 show the results for panel fixed effect regressions like the 
ones estimated in Tables 4 and 5, column 6 for different categories of 
government spending. The results obtained are fully consistent with the 
theoretical implications. In particular, pure and impure public good categories 
imply the existence of a flypaper effect at the 1 percent significance level. In 
contrast, public spending categories associated with private goods do not show 
the flypaper effect; in all cases we cannot reject that the marginal propensity to 
spend out of own subnational income equals the one from fiscal transfers. 
Since each spending category represents only a proportion of total spending, 
we should expect that the absolute size of the flypaper effect, defined as the 
difference between    and   , is bigger for total expenditure than for 
individual categories. For this reason, we define the concept of relative size of 
flypaper effect as the percentage difference between    and   . This measure 
provides for more accurate comparisons between spending categories that 
represent different proportions of total spending (Tables 1 and 2). For example, 
for Argentinean provinces, the marginal propensity to spend out of fiscal 
transfers is about 9 times as high as the one from own subnational income 
(Table 9). However, this relative size of the flypaper effect increases to about 
23 and 147 times for police and housing and urban renewal, respectively, both 
pure public goods that are hardly substitutable for private spending. On the 
other hand, the flypaper effect vanishes for private goods that are more easily 
substitutable for private spending such as public welfare and education. Table 
10 shows similar results for Brazilian states. While the marginal propensity to 
spend out of fiscal transfers is about 43 times aslarge as the one from own 
subnational income for economic services (pure public good), these 
differences vanish for police, public welfare, and education (private goods). 
In conclusion, there is robust evidence in both countries that the magnitude 
of the flypaper effect is consistently large for government spending categories 
that are hardly substitutable for private spending and vanishes for goods that 
are more easily substitutable for private spending. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
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This paper has shown that the flypaper effect is essentially consistent with a 
simple model of optimal taxation, in which raising own local revenues is 
socially costly because of the need to resort to distortionary taxation 
(Hamilton, 1986; Aragón, 2009; Dalhby, 2011). In this context, it is more 
efficient, from the point of view of the local fiscal authority, to spend more out 
of intergovernmental transfers (which is distortion-free money) than from 
private income (which can only be spent after securing it through distortionary 
taxation). 
More fundamentally, our model generates two key empirical implications. 
First, there should be a positive association between the size of the flypaper 
effect and the level of the tax rate. Second, the lower (higher) the elasticity of 
substitution between private and public spending, the higher (lower) the 
flypaper effect. We test these two implications using data for Argentinean 
provinces and Brazilian states. 
The two predictions of the model are borne out by the data. The size of the 
flypaper effect is high when tax rates are relatively high and significantly 
weakens as tax rates fall. We also find that the flypaper effect decreases with 
the degree of substitutability between private and public spending by using 
different government spending categories associated with different degree of 
“publicness”. For Argentina, for instance, we find that the marginal propensity 
to spend out of fiscal transfers in spending categories such as police and 
housing/urban renewal–which are identified as pure public goods –is much 
larger than the propensity to spend out of private income. In contrast, such 
difference in propensities to spend vanishes for spending categories such as 
education and public welfare, which are identified as private goods. 
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Appendix A. Data 
 
A1. Geographic and demographic data 
 
Terrain roughness equals (surface area/planar area)*100 – 100. The original 
dataset used to compute both planar and surface areas was provided by the 
Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI). It consists of the Global 
Digital Elevation Model acquired from the NASA/NGA Shuttle Radar 
Topography Mission (SRTM). The resolution is 3 arc seconds (or 
approximately 90 meters). The planar area (area as seen from above the earth 
surface) was computed from the afore mentioned SRTM dataset. A “true” 
surface area (i.e., one where the surfaces along the slopes are accounted for) 
was calculated from the SRTM dataset by first computing the slope for each 
pixel, then multiplying the secant (reciprocal of the cosine) of the slope and 
multiplying this value by the planar area. 
Water bodies represent the percentage of surface area covered with water 
bodies. The data are also from the ESRI. 
Population density is calculated as population/planar area. 
 
A2. Argentinean provinces 
 
Original sources and definition of variables 
Total expenditure and tax-sharing based fiscal transfers from federal 
government data for the period 1963-2000 are from Porto (2004) and from 
Dirección Nacional de Coordinación con las Provincias (Ministry of Economy, 
Argentina) for the period 2001-2006. Argentinean provinces do not receive 
intergovernmental transfers from municipalities. 
Spending categories (police, housing and urban renewal, water and sewer 
systems, public welfare, education, science and technology, and economic 
services) for the period 1991-2004 is from Dirección Nacional de 
Coordinación con las Provincias (Ministry of Economy, Argentina). 
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Gross subnational product data for the period 1963-2000 is from Porto 
(2004) and from Ministry of Economy, Argentina for the period 2001-2006. 
CPI data are from IMF/WEO. 
Population data for the period 1963-2000 is from Porto (2004) and from 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (Ministry of Economy, Argentina) 
for the period 2001-2006. 
Gross receipt tax rates data are from the following sources: Catamarca 
(Dirección de Información Parlamentaria, Cámara de Diputados de la 
Provincia de Catamarca), Chaco (Dirección de Información Parlamentaria, 
Legislatura de la Provincia del Chaco), Chubut (Biblioteca e Información 
Parlamentaria, Legislatura de la Provincia del Chubut), Córdoba (Dirección de 
Informática Jurídica, Fiscalía de Estado de la Provincia de Córdoba), Entre 
Ríos (Biblioteca del Consejo Profesional de Ciencias Económicas de Entre 
Ríos), Formosa (Legislatura de la Provincia de Formosa), La Pampa 
(Departamento Digesto, Informática Jurídica y Asesoramiento Parlamentario, 
Legislatura de la Provincia de La Pampa), Misiones (Dirección General de 
Coordinación Legislativa, Camara de Diputados de la Provincia de Misiones), 
Neuquén (Departamento de Información Parlamentaria, Legislatura de la 
Provincia de Neuquén), Río Negro (Informática Jurídica, Legislatura de la 
Provincia de Río Negro), Salta (Dirección General de Rentas, Provincia de 
Salta), Santa Fe (Camara de Diputados de la Provincia de Santa Fe), and Tierra 
del Fuego (Legislatura de Tierra del Fuego, Antártida e Islas del Atlántico 
Sur). 
Elections is a dummy variable that equals one the previous and current year 
of governor election. Electoral data are from Andy Tow‟s Atlas Electoral and 
historical newspapersarticles. 
 
Online Sources 
Porto, Alberto, 2004. Disparidades Regionales y Federalismo Fiscal. 
EDULP, Argentina. http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar 
Dirección Nacional de Coordinación con las Provincias (Ministry of 
Economy, Argentina). http://www.mecon.gov.ar/hacienda/dncfp/index.html 
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Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (Ministry of Economy, 
Argentina). http://www.indec.mecon.ar 
Tow, Andy, 2003. Atlas de elecciones en Argentina. http://towsa.com/andy 
 
A3. Brazilian states 
 
Original sources and definition of variables 
Total expenditure, fiscal transfers from federal government, spending 
categories (police, housing and urban renewal, health and hospitals, public 
welfare, education, and economic services), population and gross subnational 
product and its deflactor for the period 1985-2005 from Institute of Applied 
Economical Research (Ministry of Strategic Issues, Brazil). 
Elections is a dummy variable that equals one the previous and current year 
of governor election. Electoral data are from Institute of Applied Economical 
Research (Ministry ofStrategic Issues, Brazil). 
 
Online Sources 
Institute of Applied Economical Research (Ministry of Strategic Issues, 
Brazil). http://www.ipeadata.gov.br 
 
Appendix B. Proofs 
 
B1. Proof 1. Benchmark model. Non-distortionary taxation 
 
The PA chooses    and     in order to maximize (3) subject to (1), taking 
as given   and  . The first order conditions are given by 
 
 
  
                                                       (22) 
 
 UNSTICKING THE FLYPAPER EFFECT… 219
  
 
   
                                                       (23) 
 
                                                       (24) 
 
where     is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the PA‟s budget 
constraint (1). First-order conditions (22) and (23) imply that       . 
The Ramsey planner chooses  ,    and     subject to (4), (6), and 
          .27 Naturally, we do not need to impose the condition 
       because the Ramsey solution will satisfy it anyway. The first order 
conditions are given by 
 
  
                                                     (25) 
 
 
   
                                                   (26) 
 
 
 
                                                    (27) 
 
                                               (28) 
 
                                                     (29) 
 
where    and     denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
economy‟s and FA‟s constraints, respectively. Combining (25)-(29) we obtain 
the following analytical solutions 
 
       
 
 
                                          (30) 
                                                          
27As remarked earlier, solving the Ramsey planner‟s problem with lump-sum taxes is, of course, 
equivalentto solving the social planner‟s problem. 
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                                                 (31) 
 
          
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
                                   (32) 
 
From (30) and (31), it follows that 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
                     (33) 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
  
 
   
  
 
    
  
 
 
 
              (34) 
 
Using (7) and (33) we obtain that 
 
     
 
B2. Proof 2. Benchmark model. Distortionary taxation 
 
The PA chooses    and     in order to maximize (3) subject to (2) taking 
as given   and  . The first order conditions are given by 
 
  
                                  (35) 
 
 
   
                                  (36) 
 
                                                 (37) 
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Where      is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the PA‟s budget 
constraint (2). The implementability condition that follows from (35) and (36) 
is        ⁄   . 
The Ramsey‟s planner chooses  ,    and     subject to (5), (6), and 
       ⁄   . 
The first order conditions are given by 
 
 
  
                                   (38) 
 
 
   
                                   (39) 
 
 
 
                                    (40) 
 
                                    (41) 
 
                                         (42) 
 
where    and     denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
economy‟s and FA‟s constraints, respectively. Combining (38)-(42), we obtain 
the following analytical solutions: 
 
   
    
 
                             (43) 
 
    
 
 
                                (44) 
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                              (45) 
 
Moreover, using           , (43), and (44), we also obtain 
 
  
    
    
                                                   (46) 
 
From (43)-(45), it follows that 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
                                           (47) 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
  
                           (48) 
 
Using (7) and (47), we obtain 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Using (8), (43), (44), and (46), we obtain 
 
   
    
    
                                              (49) 
 
From (49), it follows that 
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B3. Proof 3. General model. The role of   
 
The PA maximizes (18) subject to (2) taking as given   and  . The first 
order conditions are given by 
 
  
  
  
   
                                                   (50) 
 
  
  
  
    
                                                     (51) 
 
                                                     (52) 
 
where     is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the PA‟s budget 
constraint (2). Combining (50) and (51), we obtain 
 
 
     
(
   
  
)
 
 
                                           (53) 
 
Totally differentiating and rearranging terms, we obtain 
 
  
 (
   
  
)  (
   
  
)  
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B4. Proof 4. General model. Distortionary taxation  
 
The PA chooses    and     in order to maximize (18) subject to (2), taking 
as given g and  . The first order conditions are given by 
 
   
  
  
  
   
                              (54) 
 
   
  
  
  
    
                                    (55) 
 
      
                               (56) 
 
where      is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the PA‟s budget 
constraint (2). 
We formulate the Ramsey planner‟s problem in very general terms. 
Specifically, the Ramsey planner chooses  ,    and     to maximize the PA‟s 
utility, given by (18), subject to the implementability conditions derived from 
the PA‟s maximization problem (equations (54)-(56)) and the FA‟s constraint 
(5). Therefore, the Lagrangean for the Ramsey problem can be formulated as 
 
                          
 
where           . The first order conditions are given by the 
following 9 equations: 
 
                        
  
   ,                                                     
We solved this system of nine non-linear equations using Mathematica. 
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Figure 1.  
General model with distortionary taxation: Numerical solution. 
 
Panel A Panel B 
                                 
Panel C Panel D 
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Panel E Panel F 
  
Notes:     and     stand for change in government spending as a result of a dollar 
increase in fiscal transfers and citizen's income, respectively.      and      stand 
for change in tax distortion (TD) as a result of a dollar increase in fiscal transfers and 
citizen's income, respectively.   is the elasticity of substitution between government 
and private spending.   is the consumption tax rate.     is consumption not subject to 
taxation in a distortionary taxation model and      represents consumption not subject 
to taxation in a non-distortionary taxation model. 
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Table 1.  
Fiscal transfers and government spending composition for Argentinean 
provinces. 
 
Notes: Size of government as well as relevance of fiscal transfers is calculated using 
data for the period 1963-2006. Government spending categories use data for the period 
1991-2004. GSP stands for gross subnational product, in this case gross provincial 
product. 
  
Government spending composition (as % of expenditures)
Police Housing and 
urban renewal
Public welfare Education Water and 
sewer systems
Science and 
technology
Economic 
services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Buenos Aires 28.6 11.2 2.1 4.8 31.6 1.1 0.13 6.6
Catamarca 48.5 7.1 4.6 7.2 26.1 3.1 0.11 10.3
Chaco 47.7 7.5 5.8 3.5 27.2 0.2 0.08 10.3
Chubut 29.3 8.7 7.1 2.5 24.4 0.8 16.4
Córdoba 33.3 9.9 2.4 5.8 28.3 0.6 0.23 5.3
Corrientes 48.2 9.7 8.8 3.3 28.5 0.4 0.01 7.1
Entre Ríos 40.8 8.9 3.3 3.8 27.0 0.7 0.03 11.0
Formosa 47.7 7.4 6.0 3.8 21.4 1.3 0.01 13.2
Jujuy 41.6 7.1 4.5 2.7 25.3 1.6 16.3
La Pampa 38.6 6.1 5.6 3.2 22.6 5.1 0.03 20.0
La Rioja 38.9 7.1 4.7 5.1 20.8 2.1 0.01 11.2
Mendoza 32.7 8.5 3.5 3.7 26.9 0.4 0.23 13.4
Misiones 47.5 6.9 6.5 2.5 24.4 2.4 0.02 19.2
Neuquén 24.0 7.5 4.4 5.0 25.3 2.5 0.02 16.7
Río Negro 33.1 8.1 5.7 4.3 25.8 2.0 0.06 9.0
Salta 41.8 8.5 4.6 4.1 22.9 1.6 0.29 12.4
San Juan 42.9 6.9 5.2 5.2 23.9 0.1 0.17 12.6
San Luis 46.2 6.2 10.1 5.1 26.3 0.4 0.14 18.3
Santa Cruz 25.0 7.7 6.1 2.2 21.2 0.7 0.03 22.6
Santa Fe 34.3 10.4 2.4 4.8 31.6 0.4 0.04 6.7
Santiago del Estero 50.7 9.4 6.8 1.3 28.1 1.7 10.2
Tierra del Fuego 19.1 7.6 9.2 6.4 21.2 0.8 0.27 9.5
Tucumán 41.7 7.5 4.1 3.5 25.8 0.6 0.40 8.1
Average 38.4 8.1 5.4 4.1 25.5 1.3 0.12 12.5
Min 19.1 6.1 2.1 1.3 20.8 0.1 0.01 5.3
Max 50.7 11.2 10.1 7.2 31.6 5.1 0.40 22.6
Fiscal transfers 
(as % of 
expenditures)
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Table 2. 
Fiscal transfers and government spending composition for Brazilian 
states. 
 
Notes: The data used correspond to the period 1985-2005. GSP stands for gross 
subnational product, in this case gross state product. 
 
  
Government spending composition (as % of expenditures)
Economic 
services Police Public welfare Education
Housing and 
urban renewal
Health and 
hospitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Acre 77.5 5.0 6.3 4.4 20.3 1.29 14.2
Alagoas 47.8 3.3 9.4 9.4 17.2 1.44 10.6
Amapá 89.7 3.4 3.2 2.8 17.3 2.25 11.6
Amazonas 27.1 6.5 5.5 7.5 16.6 2.30 14.6
Bahia 26.6 6.5 6.8 9.0 16.6 1.73 13.4
Ceará 32.9 8.2 4.6 12.6 17.0 1.53 8.5
Espírito Santo 18.2 2.6 7.3 11.9 13.4 0.51 10.4
Goiás 17.5 2.2 6.6 13.1 15.5 0.50 6.6
Maranhão 62.0 4.3 4.9 8.3 18.9 1.26 6.9
Mato Grosso 22.5 3.9 5.9 7.3 15.0 0.82 6.1
Mato Grosso do Sul 19.4 3.0 7.4 7.5 16.1 0.26 5.1
Minas Gerais 15.9 3.4 8.1 9.4 17.6 0.38 7.5
Paraná 16.1 7.1 6.2 15.3 20.9 1.55 5.8
Paraíba 46.0 6.2 5.2 14.7 19.2 1.11 7.3
Pará 46.0 4.0 7.3 9.4 20.1 1.23 11.8
Pernambuco 31.2 6.5 9.1 14.5 13.6 1.89 9.3
Piauí 57.6 4.8 7.7 7.5 21.8 0.18 10.6
Rio Grande do Norte 45.8 7.0 5.2 7.2 19.9 0.60 13.2
Rio Grande do Sul 12.0 3.6 6.8 17.6 14.7 0.35 3.9
Rio de Janeiro 11.8 1.6 9.7 12.4 16.3 0.94 8.3
Rondônia 49.6 5.1 10.6 2.1 19.0 0.23 9.6
Roraima 81.5 8.9 3.1 3.0 16.4 2.85 10.6
Santa Catarina 14.8 6.5 7.7 11.2 16.6 0.41 7.1
Sergipe 47.7 6.4 5.6 8.9 17.0 2.46 12.1
São Paulo 7.4 2.7 6.8 11.1 17.8 1.14 9.5
Tocantins 62.6 3.5 5.2 4.0 17.6 6.21 10.2
Average 38.0 4.9 6.6 9.3 17.4 1.36 9.4
Min 7.4 1.6 3.1 2.1 13.4 0.18 3.9
Max 89.7 8.9 10.6 17.6 21.8 6.21 14.6
Fiscal transfers 
(as % of 
expenditures)
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Table 3.  
Evolution of secondary distribution shares for provincial governments 
according to different Argentinean laws. 1963-2006 
 1963-1972 
1973
-1980 
1981
-1984 
1988
-1991 
1992
-2006 
      
      
Buenos Aires 29.7 28 28.3 21.9 24.8 
Catamarca 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.7 2.6 
Chaco 3.4 4.1 4.0 5.0 4.3 
Chubut 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.9 
Cordoba 8.6 8.9 9.0 8.8 8.1 
Corrientes 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.5 
Entre Rios 4.4 4.6 4.1 4.9 4.6 
Formosa 1.8 2.3 2.3 3.6 3.3 
Jujuy 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.8 
La Pampa 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.9 
La Rioja 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.0 
Mendoza 5.5 4.7 4.8 4.1 4.1 
Misiones 2.7 3.0 2.9 3.3 3.3 
Neuquén 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7 2.0 
Rio Negro 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Salta 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.8 3.7 
San Juan 2.9 2.6 2.5 3.4 3.2 
San Luis 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.2 
Santa Cruz 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Santa Fe 9.6 9.1 8.6 8.8 8.1 
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Santiago del 
Estero 2.8 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.8 
Tierra del Fuego 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.1 
Tucuman 4.3 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.5 
      
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources: Porto (2004) and various Argentinean laws. 
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Table 4.  
Basic flypaper regressions. Argentinean provinces. 
 
Notes: y, f, terrain roughness, water bodies, pop. density and governor pre-electoral 
period stand for GSP per capita, fiscal transfers per capita, terrain roughness, 
percentage of water bodies, population density, and governor pre-electoral period, 
respectively. Constant coefficient is not reported. FE stands for panel data fixed effect. 
R² for FE regression corresponds to within R². The value 0 is reported when the first 
three decimal digits are equal to zero. T-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
y 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.088***
[40.361] [8.828] [5.583] [5.513] [5.436] [6.947]
f 1.961*** 1.961*** 1.895*** 1.853*** 1.796*** 1.364***
[33.873] [10.364] [9.554] [9.138] [8.968] [6.770]
terrain roughness 46.067** 46.244** 47.127**
[2.200] [2.307] [2.335]
water bodies 14.839* 15.028* 15.651*
[1.979] [1.990] [2.070]
pop. density -1.070* -1.295** 5.415**
[-1.729] [-2.236] [2.190]
governor pre-electoral period 89.227*** 100.182***
[3.345] [3.155]
Flypaper effect
  test: βf = βy (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0
  absolute size = βf - βy 1.862 1.862 1.808 1.767 1.711 1.276
  relative size = (βf - βy)/ βy 19 19 21 21 20 15
Statistics
  Econometric methodology OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
  Observations 1012 1012 1012 1012 1012 1012
  Provinces 23 23 23 23 23 23
  Period 1963-2006 1963-2006 1963-2006 1963-2006 1963-2006 1963-2006
  Av. number of obs. per province
44 44 44 44 44 44
  R² 0.782 0.782 0.798 0.800 0.801 0.572
robust - 
cluster
  Standard errors standard robust - 
cluster
robust - 
cluster
robust - 
cluster
robust - 
cluster
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Table 5.  
Basic flypaper regressions. Brazilian states. 
 
Notes: y, f, terrain roughness, water bodies, pop. density and governor pre-electoral 
period stand for GSP per capita, fiscal transfers per capita, terrain roughness, 
percentage of water bodies, population density, and governor pre-electoral period, 
respectively. Constant coefficient is not reported. FE stands for panel data fixed effect. 
R² for FE regression corresponds to within R². The value 0 is reported when the first 
three decimal digits are equal to zero. T-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
Total exp. 
per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
y 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.002
[27.786] [14.459] [11.908] [12.657] [12.675] [0.094]
f 0.888*** 0.888*** 0.872*** 0.876*** 0.875*** 1.018***
[48.161] [17.814] [20.981] [21.604] [21.419] [32.947]
terrain roughness -13.934 -25.708 -24.462
[-0.648] [-0.907] [-0.867]
water bodies -70.924** -77.895*** -77.008***
[-2.626] [-2.864] [-2.817]
pop. density 0.103 0.093 1.818***
[0.853] [0.778] [3.300]
governor pre-electoral period 49.694*** 37.617**
[2.795] [2.155]
Flypaper effect
  test: βf = βy (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0
  absolute size = βf - βy 0.795 0.795 0.765 0.769 0.768 1.016
  relative size = (βf - βy)/ βy 9 9 7 7 7 508
Statistics
  Econometric methodology OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
  Observations 541 541 541 541 541 541
  States 26 26 26 26 26 26
  Period 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005
  Av. number of obs. per state 20.8 20.8 20.8 20.8 20.8 20.8
  R² 0.834 0.834 0.843 0.843 0.846 0.597
robust - 
cluster
standard robust - 
cluster
robust - 
cluster
robust - 
cluster
robust - 
cluster
  Standard errors
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Table 6.  
Flypaper regressions by tax rate levels. Argentinean provinces. 
 
Notes: y and f stand for GSP per capita and fiscal transfers per capita, respectively. 
Constant as well as control variables coefficients (population density and 
governor/mayor pre-electoral period) are not reported. FE stands for panel data fixed 
effect. R² corresponds to within R². The value 0 is reported when the first three 
decimal digits are equal to zero. T-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Tax rates All Below median Above median
Total exp. Total exp. Total exp. 
per capita per capita per capita
(1) (2) (3)
y 0.084*** 0.098*** 0.069***
[12.491] [19.194] [14.347]
f 1.252*** 0.934*** 1.233***
[9.714] [4.708] [7.397]
Flypaper effect
  test: βf = βy (p-value) 0 0.001 0
  absolute size = βf - βy 1.168 0.836 1.164
  relative size = (βf - βy)/ βy 14 9 17
Statistics
  Econometric methodology FE FE FE
robust- robust- robust-
cluster cluster cluster
  Controls Yes Yes Yes
  Observations 512 242 270
  Provinces/cities 13 13 13
  Period 1963-2006 1963-2006 1963-2006
  Av. number of obs. per province/city
39.4 18.6 20.8
  R² 0.549 0.619 0.364
  Standard errors
Dependent variable
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Table 7. 
Degree of congestion or "publicness" of publicly provided goods. 
Argentinean provinces. 
 
Notes: Y, pop, tax share and pop. density stand for GSP, population, tax share, and 
population density, respectively. Constant coefficient is not reported. FE stands for 
panel data fixed effect. R² corresponds to within R². T-statistics in parentheses.  
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Dependent variable
(natural logarithm of)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Y) 0.925*** 0.806*** 0.989*** 0.526*** 0.906*** 1.158** 0.559 1.525***
[10.691] [8.056] [4.743] [2.826] [9.378] [2.660] [1.536] [7.980]
ln(pop)  (coef. ω2) 0.469** -0.039 -0.606 3.329*** 0.672** -4.334 -0.502 0.328
[2.128] [-0.097] [-0.820] [3.179] [2.434] [-1.625] [-0.301] [0.327]
ln(tax share)  (coef. ω3) -0.061 -0.148 0.051 0.178 -0.235 -0.031 1.028 0.414
[-0.316] [-0.828] [0.112] [0.682] [-1.420] [-0.036] [0.924] [0.899]
pop. density 0.011*** 0.014** -0.017** 0.000 0.010 0.048 0.012 -0.003
[3.002] [2.322] [-2.090] [0.005] [1.348] [1.308] [0.577] [-0.167]
Congestion parameter  γ
  γ = ω2/(1+ ω3) 0.499 -0.046 -0.577 2.826 0.878 -4.473 -0.248 0.232
  test: γ = 0 (p-value) 0.026 0.924 0.495 0.011 0.063 0.307 0.789 0.724
  test: γ = 1 (p-value) 0.026 0.040 0.071 0.086 0.790 0.214 0.188 0.248
  "publicness" impure public pure public pure public private private undetermined undetermined undetermined
Statistics
  Econometric methodology FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust-
cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
  Observations 322 322 322 322 322 317 202 322
  Provinces 23 23 23 23 23 23 20 23
  Period 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004
  Av. number of obs. per province
14 14 14 14 14 13.8 10.1 14
  R² 0.528 0.410 0.207 0.309 0.420 0.073 0.014 0.296
  Standard errors
Total exp. Police Science and 
technology
Economic 
services
Housing and 
urban renewal
Public 
welfare
Education Water and 
sewer systems
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Table 8. 
Degree of congestion or "publicness" of publicly provided goods. 
Brazilian states. 
 
Notes: Y, pop, tax share and pop. density stand for GSP, population, tax share, and 
population density, respectively. Constant coefficient is not reported. FE stands for 
panel data fixed effect. R² corresponds to within R². T-statistics in parentheses.  
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Dependent variable
(natural logarithm of)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Y) 0.454*** 0.518 0.769*** 0.539 0.256 0.306 1.003***
[3.846] [1.583] [3.915] [1.369] [1.562] [0.601] [4.333]
ln(pop)  (coef. ω2) 0.475 -1.178*** 0.945 1.901 0.730 0.748 0.345
[1.330] [-2.810] [1.481] [1.677] [1.556] [0.509] [0.481]
ln(tax share)  (coef. ω3) -0.093 -0.292 -0.386 0.322 -0.497* 0.748 0.005
[-0.614] [-1.237] [-1.366] [1.329] [-1.825] [1.066] [0.016]
pop. density 0.004** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.005**
[2.745] [3.264] [2.075] [0.665] [0.858] [-0.748] [2.611]
Congestion parameter  γ
  γ = ω2/(1+ ω3) 0.524 -1.664 1.539 1.438 1.451 0.428 0.343
  test: γ = 0 (p-value) 0.174 0.114 0.0308 0.0519 0.0634 0.559 0.594
  test: γ = 1 (p-value) 0.216 0.0147 0.431 0.540 0.551 0.436 0.311
  "publicness" undetermined pure public private private private undetermined undetermined
Statistics
  Econometric methodology FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust-
cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
  Observations 533 451 533 532 533 513 533
  States 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
  Period 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005
  Av. number of obs. per state 20.5 17.3 20.5 20.5 20.5 19.7 20.5
  R² 0.548 0.040 0.374 0.215 0.470 0.005 0.318
  Standard errors
Education Housing and 
urban renewal
Health and 
hospitals
Total exp. Economic 
services
Police 
protection
Public 
welfare
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Table 9. 
Flypaper regressions by category of government spending. Argentinean 
provinces. 
 
Notes: y and f stand for GSP per capita and fiscal transfers per capita, respectively. 
Constant as well as control variables coefficients (population density and governor 
pre-electoral period) are not reported. FE stands for panel data fixed effect. R² 
corresponds to within R². The value 0 is reported when the first three decimal digits 
are equal to zero. The denominator of relative size equals to -βy if βy<0. T-statistics in 
parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Dependent variable
Total exp. 
per capita
Police per 
capita
Housing and 
urban renewal 
per capita
Public 
welfare per 
capita
Education 
per capita
Water and 
sewer systems 
per capita
Science and 
technology 
per capita
Economic 
services per 
capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
y 0.082*** 0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.023*** -0.001 0.000*** 0.017
[4.021] [2.111] [0.194] [0.631] [5.770] [-0.495] [3.264] [1.067]
f 0.806*** 0.095*** 0.138*** 0.008 0.105* 0.056*** -0.003 0.111
[5.729] [6.474] [4.416] [0.655] [1.834] [4.435] [-1.630] [0.963]
"Publicness'' impure 
public
pure public pure public private private undetermined undetermined undetermined
Flypaper effect
  test: βf = βy (p-value) 0 0 0 0.604 0.161 0 0.103 0.469
  absolute size = βf - βy 0.724 0.091 0.137 0.007 0.082 0.057 -0.003 0.094
  relative size = (βf - βy)/ βy 9 23 137 7 4 57 -12 6
Statistics
  Econometric methodology FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust-
cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  Observations 322 322 322 322 322 317 202 322
  Provinces 23 23 23 23 23 23 20 23
  Period 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-2004
  Av. number of obs. per province 14 14 14 14 14 13.8 10.1 14
  R² 0.254 0.259 0.113 0.014 0.194 0.063 0.059 0.069
  Standard errors
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Table 10. 
Flypaper regressions by category of government spending. Brazilian 
states. 
 
Notes: y and f stand for GSP per capita and fiscal transfers per capita, respectively. 
Constant as well as control variables coefficients (population density and governor 
pre-electoral period) are not reported. FE stands for panel data fixed effect. R² 
corresponds to within R². The value 0 is reported when the first three decimal digits 
are equal to zero. The denominator of relative size equals to      if     . T-
statistics in parentheses.  
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 
 
Dependent variable
Total exp. per 
capita
Economic 
services per 
capita
Police per 
capita
Public welfare 
per capita
Education per 
capita
Housing and 
urban renewal 
per capita
Health and 
hospitals per 
capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
y 0.002 -0.001 0.010*** 0.004 0.008** -0.010* 0.011***
[0.094] [-0.300] [3.402] [0.748] [2.144] [-1.805] [3.487]
f 1.018*** 0.042*** 0.018 0.018 -0.033 0.088*** 0.076***
[32.947] [5.738] [1.238] [0.873] [-0.812] [4.573] [5.842]
"Publicness'' undetermined pure public private private private undetermined undetermined
Flypaper effect
  test: βf = βy (p-value) 0 0 0.602 0.533 0.321 0 0
  absolute size = βf - βy 1.016 0.043 0.008 0.014 -0.041 0.098 0.065
  relative size = (βf - βy)/ βy 508 43 1 4 -5 10 6
Statistics
  Econometric methodology FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust- robust-
cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  Observations 541 455 541 540 541 521 541
  States 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
  Period 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005 1985-2005
  Av. number of obs. per state 20.8 17.5 20.8 20.8 20.8 20.0 20.8
  R² 0.597 0.018 0.321 0.068 0.052 0.086 0.232
  Standard errors

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
